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FROM ''MORAL STUPIDITY" TO PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSmILITY 
THOMAS D. EISELE· 
"We are all of us born in moral stupidity, taking the world as an udder 
to feed our supreme selves: Dorothea had early begun to emerge from 
that stupidity, but yet it had been easier to her to imagine how she 
would devote herself to Mr Casaubon, and become wise and strong in 
his strength and wisdom, than to conceive with that distinctness which 
is no longer reflection but feeling-an idea wrought back to the 
directness of sense, like the solidity of objects-that he had an 
equivalent centre of self, whence the lights and shadows must always 
fall with a certain difference." 
George Eliot, Middlemarch 1 
Within the context-even, the challenge-presented by the first 
chapter of Seymour Wishman's book, Confessions of a Criminal Lawyer,2 
we symposiasts have been invited to say something about the teaching 
of courses which in law school go under the titles, "Legal Ethics," 
"Professional Ethics," or "Professional Responsibility." This last is the 
title of a two-credit course that I teach, in what I take to be a fairly 
traditional form, over the span of a semester at the University of 
Cincinnati. In this essay, I want to talk about the teaching of such a 
course; not about how I manage to teach it, however, but rather why I 
find it so difficult to teach. 
For I do find the traditional Legal Ethics course difficult to 
teach-difficult and demanding and frustrating. And it is difficult in a 
way that I believe is not common to the difficulties and demands faced 
in teaching other traditional courses in law school (e.g., Property, 
Estates & Trusts, Jurisprudence). By way of warning, I should note that 
in making my comments I claim no expertise in this field. I have taught 
Legal Ethics only three times in the past seven years. What I have to 
* Judge Joseph P. Kinneary Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati. I appreciate the 
critical comments on an earlier version of this paper that I received from Jim Elkins, Tom 
Shaffer, and Jim White. They helped me to say better what I wished to say, without 
endorsing it. 
I dedicate this essay to Tom Shaffer, as a way of honoring his work in this field. No one 
of whom I know has made a more personal or professional contribution to the teaching of 
Legal Ethics. Tom Shaffer cares; and he is committed to the ensuing work entailed by such 
caring. 
1 George Eliot, MIDDLEMARCH 243 (Baltimore: Penguin Books, W. J. Harvey ed., 
1965)(first published 1871-1872). 
2 Seymour Wishman, CONFESSIONS OF A CRIMINAL LAWYER (New York: Penguin Books, 
1982)(1981). 
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say, then, others before me may have noticed-and they may have noted 
it better, or at least differently, than I shall mark and enter it here for 
discussion. All I wish for my comments is that they help to identify what 
seems to be a systematic tension in the teaching of a traditional Legal 
Ethics course, and that they do so within the context of considering 
Seymour Wishman's balanced and considered recounting of his own 
struggles (as he was turning himself into an experienced criminal 
lawyer) with the ethics of his actions. 
I. THE DIFFICULTY OF TEACHING A TRADITIONAL COURSE IN LEGAL 
ETHICS 
Let me start by saying that Legal Ethics is my least favorite course 
among the five courses that I teach with any regularity. This is not a 
promising beginning. Nevertheless, it seems the right place to start, 
because such an admission impels me to seek some sort of an 
explanation for this lack of enthusiasm. After all, as a law teacher of 
some 10-15 years of experience, I am admitting that I take responsibility 
for teaching a course that I don't much enjoy. Short of masochism, why 
would anyone (anyone with tenure) undertake such an apparently self-
eviscerating project? Also, I recognize that my attitude toward the 
traditional Legal Ethics course is incongruous in another respect. Over 
the years, I have on the whole enjoyed teaching in law school and have 
found it rewarding. So why is this course so difficult? What might 
explain my antipathy toward teaching Legal Ethics? 
The most readily available candidate for an explanation-the fact 
that the materials of such a course are themselves difficult and 
unwieldy-can, I think, be put aside. It is notorious that, in dealing with 
issues of professional ethics, the applicable materials are various and 
complicated. They include not only a variety of federal and state cases, 
but also two general codes from the American Bar Association3 (adopted 
in several variations by the 50 states), as well as a vast array of state 
and federal statutes. (In using the phrase, "traditional Legal Ethics 
course," I am assuming in part that such a course comprises this 
collection of variegated source materials. A differently constituted course 
would not be "traditional" in my use of that term.) Then, too, this 
plethora of materials is further complicated by the fact that cases posing 
legal ethics issues arise within (and implicate other issues of law in) 
every area of substantive and procedural law. These facts mean, 
3 The 1969 Model Code of Professional Responsibility and the 1983 Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct. 
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however, only that a course in Legal Ethics is difficult to master. But 
such difficulty is not in itself a reason for rmding a Legal Ethics course 
unrewarding. AB many teachers would testify, the challenge of 
mastering a difficult course can be a spur to a teacher's creativity, 
goading one on to greater effort. Mastery brings with it an increased 
sense of accomplishment. (For example, in my struggles to master the 
notorious Rule against Perpetuities, which I teach in both my Property 
and my Estates & Trusts courses, the difficulty of mastering the Rule 
has not meant that I have fo'und teaching either course unrewarding; 
just the opposite is true.) 
If, then, it is not simply the struggle of comprehending such various 
materials, and of communicating them cogently to one's students, what 
makes the traditional Legal Ethics course difficult to teach? And why 
might one find the teaching of these materials to be unrewarding? In 
thinking about these questions, I have come to the conclusion that 
teaching the traditional Legal Ethics course is difficult (and I find it 
unrewarding) because it engages me in teaching in a way that I do not 
otherwise teach in law school. One way of stating my sense of the 
pervasive difficulty of teaching a traditional course in Legal Ethics is to 
say that, in such a course, law teachers are asked (or required-by the 
materials) to teach against how or what we teach in most other courses 
in law school. 
The dilemma is this. In law school, we teach our students how to 
analyze and argue cases, using the rules and the legal materials as they 
find them, whichever side they may find themselves on.4 This means 
that law students must learn to understand and apply legal rules 
without qualms about any pre-existing commitment they may have in 
favor of one side or another of a legal issue. Or, perhaps it is better to 
say, law students are asked to commit themselves only to the argument 
itself, to forging the best argument (logically, rationally, persuasively) 
they can manage to forge out of the materials at hand. In this respect, 
they are rhetoricians. And this is not a bad thing; "rhetoric" is not an 
epithet in law school.5 Law students are expected, and are trained, to 
• Elsewhere, I have tried to describe in more detail the process of disillusionment and 
reaffirmation through which law teachers take their students (on my account of a modified 
Socratic method of teaching). A part of this lesson is learning that the applicable rules, 
cases, and other legal materials always have two (or more) sides. Interested readers might 
wish to look at my essay: Thomas D. Eisele, Bitter Knowledge: Socrates and Teaching by 
Disillusionment, 45 Mercer L, Rev. 587 (1994). 
5 More than anyone else, James Boyd White has made accessible-while he also has 
resuscitated-the rhetorical dimension of lawyering, His work rescues rhetoric from its 
pejorative fate in the ancient tradition of Socrates and Plato (by using the very resources 
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commit themselves to the side they are fortuitously assigned in class, 
just as they will find themselves in practice committing themselves to 
their client, whoever he or she may be, when the client walks into their 
law offices and presents them with a legal problem, a case. 
This way of teaching instructs law students that they are agents for 
their clients, fiduciaries who must take seriously the responsibility of 
representing their client's interests as best they can. By and large, law 
students learn this lesson well. In my experience, they take seriously 
their vicarious responsibility for the positions they assert and defend (as 
they also take seriously their personal responsibility for the quality of 
the work they do in law school). And this development continues in law 
practice, where it is pretty much the normal course of events for lawyers 
to adopt the positions of their clients. By advocating clients' positions or 
interests, we advocates identify with them-those positions or interests 
and, indirectly, with those clients. (In a sense, we turn ourselves into 
them.) I suspect that most of us most of time become captured by the 
positions and interests of our clients, of our principals. "You are what 
you speak." We become co-opted by, or captive of, the side we represent. 
We come to believe in the justice of the case we are presenting (in court 
or in negotiations). 
But this way of teaching changes in traditional Legal Ethics courses, 
or the dynamics of the teaching change. In the traditional Legal Ethics 
course, we typically try to prevent (or, at least, to resist) this transfor-
mation. In such courses, we turn around and ask our students to pierce 
the veil of their vicarious (substitute) responsibility, their representation 
of their client's interests, so that they can consider the ethical dimension 
of their own actions on behalf of their principal. In effect, we are 
challenging our students to assess themselves (their behavior, their 
actions as lawyers for their clients) on the basis of their own cares and 
commitments, their own interests. And yet they still are being taught 
this lesson within the larger context of their being taught to emulate 
and enact the role of the uncommitted advocate, the advocate for hire. 
In traditional Legal Ethics courses, then, we teachers seem to be 
telling our students (asking them, rather) to conform their lawyering 
activities to the following two conflicting maxims: 
of that tradition to reconstitute itselO. In particular, I recommend White's third book as an 
instructive way of coming to appreciate the rhetorical dimension of the law. See James 
Boyd White, HERACLES' Bow: ESSAYS ON THE RHEToRIC AND POETICS OF THE LAw (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1985)(especially Chapter 2). 
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(1) Treat this activity oflawyering-of argument, of advocacy, even of 
analysis-as something impersonal to you: it is a task, a professional 
challenge or chore, but something that exists only on the level of your 
representation of another, your vicarious (substitute) responsibility for 
the interests and rights of another person; and 
(2) Treat this same activity oflawyering as something personal to you, 
something for which you take not only professional responsibility but 
also personal responsibility, something for which you are answerable 
(as any person is). 
We seem to be telling our students two fundamentally opposed 
things: (1) Be impersonal and professional; and (2) Be yourself (be the 
person you were or are outside of your role as lawyer). And, if this is 
what we are saying, then how can we expect our students to embrace 
such a fundamentally dissonant activity? Can we expect them, or even 
hope for them, to resolve it? (Where "it" refers to perhaps the fundamen-
tal antinomy of the legal profession, in so far as that profession is built 
upon an adversarial ethic, or an ethics of advocacy.) I am not sure that 
we can expect them to achieve on their own a resolution of this conflict. 
Yet, I also am not sure that in class I can help them to resolve this 
conflict. For a teacher, it is an unrewarding fix in which to find oneself. 
II. PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY V. VICARIOUS RESPONSIBILITY 
I am not the first person to have noticed this dichotomy in the 
dynamics of teaching a Legal Ethics course. For example, I hear this 
perception of dissonance being expressed in the "Introduction" of the 
book that I like best in this area, Thomas L. Shaffer's wonderfully rich 
and challenging casebook, American Legal Ethics.s 
Shaffer introduces his casebook by noting the extent to which a 
Legal Ethics course can be built around two related conflicts of values. 
He says (1) that, on his view, the field of Legal Ethics "insists on being 
both personal and cultural";7 and (2) that its questions "are broad 
[moral] questions; but ... they are also vicarious."8 He brings together 
these two possible foci of a Legal Ethics course in the following passage: 
6 Thomas L. Shaffer, AMERICAN LEGAL ETHICS: TExT, READINGS, AND DISCUSSION TOPICS 
(New York: Matthew Bender, 1985). 
7 Id. at xxi (emphases in original). 
8 Id. at xxiii. 
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This vicarious focus gives our subject two kinds of tension: (1) between 
a lawyer's morals and the morals of his client, and (2) between a 
lawyer's morals and his sense of public and professional duty. Those 
tensions are topical in legal-ethics classrooms; we who work together 
there are aware of the tensions; we feel them.9 
Some teachers may feel or experience these tensions. But do we know 
what to make ofthem? I am not sure that we-or that I-do. 
Shaffer's identification of these tensions, these dynamic pressures 
and conflicts, is rich beyond count, and his work suggests any number 
of dimensions along which we might measure the course of a person's 
ethical conflicts. I cannot profitably work out the variety of dimensions 
here, but instead must limit myself simply to mentioning two. 
First, Shaffer's "personal/cultural" distinction cuts in a couple of 
directions. At a minimum, it describes (i) the tension between an 
individual lawyer's sense of himself or herself as a person, as an 
individual; and that individual lawyer's sense of himself or herself as a 
member of a community-be the community legal or non-legal (religious, 
political, ethnic, whatever). And the "personal/cultural" distinction also 
describes (ii) the tension between an individual lawyer's sense of himself 
or herself as a lawyer, an individual craftsperson; and that individual 
lawyer's sense of himself or herself as a member of the profession, the 
legal community.lO 
Second, Shaffer's "moral/vicarious" distinction also cuts in a couple 
of directions. At a minimum, it portends (i) the tension between a 
lawyer's commitment to his or her own personal moral code; and that 
same lawyer's commitment to a professional moral code. The 
"moral/vicarious" distinction also describes (ii) the tension between a 
lawyer's commitment to any moral code (be it personal or professional); 
and that same lawyer's commitment to represent the interests of his or 
her client (the person for whom he or she is vicariously responsible). 
Here, I am drawing selectively from Shaffer's dichotomies to 
examine, on the one hand, a lawyer's personal responsibility for what he 
or she does; and, on the other, his or her vicarious responsibility for the 
same. Let me try to develop this distinction on what seems to be an 
intuitive level. At a minimum, lawyers are personally responsible for 
9 Id. at xxiv (emphasis in original). 
10 It seems to me to be possible that an individual lawyer might also be divided between 
his or her sense of himself or herself as an individual craftsperson; and his or her belonging 
to a non-legal community (be it religious, political, ethnic, or whatever). But this further 
development only emphasizes my earlier statement that these dichotomies are capable of 
additional elaboration, and I do not here wish to proceed further along this line. 
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what they make out of the legal materials at their disposal. If they 
fashion a poor argument or craft a lousy brief, this is something for 
which they are personally responsible. This poor argument, this lousy 
brief, is something they themselves did, and it reflects directly upon 
their person (even in its guise as a lawyer). That a lawyer has to make 
an argument on behalf of his or her client is not something the lawyer 
has chosen; it is a necessity of the role of being a lawyer, a necessity of 
the activity oflawyering. This much every lawyer must accept--or else 
stop being a lawyer. But which argument a lawyer makes on behalf of 
his or her client-and how the selected argument is made-are very 
much a function of choices made by that lawyer. 
Summarizing, I would say that a lawyer is vicariously responsible 
for the necessity of making an argument, because that is something he 
or she must do once the lawyer has accepted the assignment of 
representing a particular client. The lawyer is vicariously responsible for 
making an argument because this is something done on behalf of the 
client; it is done as proxy for the client (because the client otherwise 
would have to make an argument for himself or herself, if no one were 
willing to represent him or her). But what argument the lawyer 
subsequently makes and how well or poorly he or she makes it are both 
actions for which the lawyer is personally responsible. The particular 
argument made is an artifact that the lawyer has fashioned and entered 
into the legal arena, and every artist or craftsman is personally 
responsible for his or her work. 
This is, for me, the most intuitive level on which the "personal" 
versus "vicarious" distinction works. But this distinction also seems 
applicable to the activity of lawyering on a slightly different level, 
perhaps a more general or abstract one. Here we are talking not about 
the specific distinction between types of responsibility solely at the level 
of legal argument, but rather about differing types of responsibility that 
a lawyer has qua lawyer (whatever activity oflawyering the lawyer may 
be engaged in, be it making an argument or something else). What we 
might call our "vicarious responsibility as lawyers" locates our 
responsibility for the protection and advancement (if legally possible) of 
our clients' best interests. We substitute for (stand in the shoes of) our 
clients in the sense that we try to achieve their goals or effect their 
wishes (all, of course, within the bounds of the law). On the other hand, 
our "personal responsibility as individuals who happen to be lawyers" 
locates, instead, our responsibility for the consequences of our actions in 
our role as lawyers, including their effects upon people not our clients. 
Vicarious responsibility narrows or focuses our responsibility by 
limiting it (not removing it). Our vicarious responsibility is concentrated 
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in our role as advocate for and protector of the interests of our client. In 
terms of vicarious responsibility, we lawyers are (solely? wholly?) 
committed to our client's well-being. ll 
Personal responsibility, on the other hand, dilutes our responsibility 
(again, without removing it). It spreads wider the net or web of our 
moral commitments by including in this wider system the interests and 
well-being of others: parties for the other side, "neutral" parties (e.g., 
witnesses or experts at a trial), the court itself (at least in the person of 
the judge), lawyers for the other side, and so on. Our personal 
responsibility includes our actions as lawyers in so far as we are persons 
or individuals (who happen to be lawyers). In this respect, then, the role 
of lawyering does not define or delimit our personal responsibility. This 
professional role may, in fact, involve us in more-and in more 
complicated-ethical relationships than we otherwise would find 
ourselves involved in. On the personal level, the role of lawyering does 
not contract our moral responsibility-instead, that role expands our 
moral responsibility. Whereas, on the vicarious level, the role of 
lawyering contracts (rather than expands) our moral responsibility. This 
dissonance in moral effect, then, seems to be the source of many ens~g 
ethical conflicts. 
If I am correct in my brief sketch of this complex of relationships 
between vicarious responsibility and personal responsibility, then I hope 
that it can serve as a rough guide for thinking about some of the 
11 I hesitate here (putting in parentheses my queries, "solely? wholly?") because I am 
mindful that lawyers have professional responsibilities toward people or institutions other 
than their clients (e.g., toward a court in which they are appearing or the judge before 
whom they are appearing). It seems to me at least initially plausible to characterize such 
responsibilities as being in part vicarious and in part personal, and it would require a great 
deal of time and space to develop or show the plausibility in such a claim. 
On the other hand, there seem to be professional responsibilities that are neither 
vicarious nor personal. For example, we sometimes speak of a lawyer's responsibility "for 
the (current state or condition of the) law," or "for the legal system (as a whole)." 
Sometimes, we even speak oflawyers' being responsible for "our criminal justice system" 
or the "workings of the judicial process." How are we conceiving such responsibilities? They 
hardly seem equivalent to the vicarious responsibility a lawyer has for the interests of his 
or her client, for they are not episodic in the same way and do not seem to be related to a 
specific task accepted-{)r a particular agency relationship assumed-by a lawyer (as is the 
case, I believe, with a lawyers vicarious responsibility toward a client). On the other hand, 
I do not know that I would be willing to call these "personal responsibilities," because such 
objects as "the law" or "the state of the criminal justice system" do not strike me as the 
sorts of things for which a person can take personal responsibility. 
Accordingly, I am aware that the dichotomy I explore (between vicarious and personal 
responsibility) neither explains nor clarifies everything we may want to know about a 
lawyer's responsibilities for his or her actions. 
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conflicting ethical demands made upon lawyers' behavior. Now, I want 
to move on to ask: Can we expect or hope that our students in a 
traditional Legal Ethics course will be able to resolve this complex 
tension of ethical commitments or responsibilities? 
I doubt that they can. The problem, as I see it, is this. In teaching 
law, as I stated above, we traditionally require our students to make 
arguments (or to perform case analyses) in class. And the rules (or the 
cases) are there, in the classroom, to be used in argument (or to be 
analyzed). Since they are there, we-all who participate in the 
class-can witness and assess how well or poorly, how aptly or 
inappropriately, how cogently or incoherently, the student does 
performing the assignment. This means that we all can see and judge 
how the assigned student relates himself or herself to the task at hand: 
how well they argue, how poorly they analyze, how cogently they 
marshal the facts, how incoherently they recount the parties' stories, etc. 
The arguments, the cases, the facts, the claims-all of them are a part 
of the reality of the classroom; they are something we actually create as 
well as use (along with the aid and assistance of our students) before our 
very eyes. They exist in the classroom as a product of people arguing, 
debating, analyzing, hypothesizing, explaining, describing, etc., then and 
there. 
It mayor may not be the case that the argument a student makes 
in class would or would not "work" in the "real world"; that is a matter 
for speculation and, possibly, informed debate. But it is necessarily the 
case that the argument made in the classroom does either work or fail 
there, as it is made.12 And so we can assess each student's fulfillment of 
his or her personal responsibility for the rightness, the aptness, the 
cogency, ofthe argument. The student's responsibility for what he or she 
has fashioned can be studied and assessed in the classroom. 
The same cannot be said for the student's ability either to represent 
a client, or to relate to a client (or, for that matter, a student's ability to 
relate to other, non-client parties who might hypothetically be made a 
part of the argumentative context). Except for special situations-such 
as clinical settings or empirical simulations-we cannot say that there 
12 When we make an argument in law school, that is exactly what we do: we make an 
argument. It may not be exactly the same argument one would make in court (or in front 
of a particular judge), but it remains as truly and actually an argument as any might or can 
be. And the student's responsibility for the argument he or she fashions remains the same 
as it would be in the so-called "real world." In other words, the student's responsibility for 
the quality of the argument he or she makes, does not change depending upon the forum 
in which the student makes the argument. 
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is a client for a student to represent, or to whom to relate.13 No actual 
client exists; no actual lawsuit exists; and no actual court exists. And, 
because of this, there is no way we have oftrying to estimate or assess 
how a student might treat the client, how he or she might actually 
resolve a conflict that arises (say) between the student's sense of 
vicarious responsibility for the client's interests and the student's sense 
of personal responsibility (toward himself or herself or toward others). 
We can, of course, try to simulate these things, and sometimes we 
succeed. But the value of simulation as a teaching technique only proves 
my point, because what we are trying to simulate in the classroom is the 
thing we feel missing: the reality of the other, the reality of the client and 
of others involved in an actual lawsuit (or legal transaction). We resort 
to simulation when we feel the need for a larger dose of reality, when we 
feel the need for more realism. But what we are thereby trying to make 
real, to simulate, is the reality ofthe ethical conflict between a lawyer's 
personal and vicarious responsibilities. Perhaps, on occasion, legal 
clinics and class simulations fill this need;14 but, without them, the 
classroom experience of a Legal Ethics course does not and cannot 
reproduce or duplicate the reality of the ethical conflict we expect (or 
hope) our students will learn to resolve in such courses. And, without 
such replication, how can we expect them to achieve such a resolution? 
How are they supposed to resolve a conflict that we are unable to 
reproduce in the classroom? 
I am trying to convey my sense that arguments in law school (as well 
as analyses, hypotheses, theories, claims, facts, etc.) are factors in 
relation to which a law student's behavior can be assessed (ethically, or 
otherwise). But a law student's behavior cannot be assessed with respect 
to how well (or poorly) the student relates to his or her client (or to the 
client's lawsuit, or to the court, or to the judge, or to the other parties, 
,3 I am reminded that my remarks are limited to what I am calling the "traditional Legal 
Ethics course" when I read the collection of materials in a recent symposium issue: 
Teaching Legal Ethics, 58 Law & Contemp. Probs. 1 (1995). These materials suggest that 
alternative courses exist. For example, Robert Burns describes a one-semester course at 
Northwestern University that integrates Trial Advocacy, Evidence, and Legal Ethics taught 
through simulation, which integrated course receives 10-credits. See Robert Burns, 
Teaching the Basic Ethics Class Through Simulation, 58 Law & Contemp. Probs. 37, 43 n. 
19 (1995). Still, for law schools lacking either the curricular flexibility or the institutional 
resources described in this set of papers, I suspect that the traditional Legal Ethics course 
will remain the norm. (Perhaps it should not; but I suspect it will.) 
1< On teaching legal ethics in a clinical setting, see Thomas L. Shaffer, On Teaching 
Legal Ethics in the Law Office, 71 Notre Dame L. Rev. 605 (1996); and Christine Mary 
Venter, Encouraging Personal Responsibility-An Alternative Approach to Teaching Legal 
Ethics, 58 Law & Con temp. Probs. 287 (1995). 
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etc.) because no such client (or lawsuit, or court, ... ) exists in law school. 
So, the potential conflict between the student's personal responsibility 
and his or her vicarious responsibility, is not reallyoposed in class, and 
it cannot be. (I do not say that such a conflict cannot be imagined or 
described in class; I only say that it cannot be created or posed.) In the 
law school setting (except, again, in the circumstances of live-client 
clinics and some empirical simulations), creating or duplicating such a 
conflict is not a pedagogical possibility. And, if such a conflict cannot be 
posed, then whatever learning we hope to be generated or gained by a 
student's struggling to resolve such a possible conflict, cannot 
occur-because the conflict is not there for the student to resolve. 
III. WISHMAN'S STORY 
It is at this juncture that I find Wishman's autobiographical passage 
to be useful. It shows us how and when and where ethical conflicts can 
arise in the life of a lawyer. In this respect, Wishman's account is a 
useful supplement to the law school classroom, because Wishman's story 
demonstrates that these potential conflicts (about which we may have 
been talking in the classroom, but which are, I am claiming, generally 
impossible to duplicate in the classroom) are real. They can and do 
happen to lawyers in the course of their professional lives. So Wishman 
shows us, for example, that a lawyer's vicarious responsibility for his 
client may well conflict with that lawyer's personal responsibility toward 
himself, or toward others (who may include-but who are not limited 
to-his client), or toward all of these people, and perhaps even others. 
Such conflicts are often lived out in the developing life of any lawyer. 
The story in Wishman's first chapter tells of the development of his 
moral sensibility as a young lawyer, and for this purpose Wishman 
focuses on two very distressing, disconcerting, experiences. One relates 
to a nurse, a Mrs. Lewis, who was the victim of an alleged rape and, 
thus, was the main witness at the trial regarding the crime. Wishman 
was counsel for the defendant. How Wishman treated Mrs. Lewis on the 
witness stand, and how he later came to view his treatment of her, are 
the two main threads of his first recounting. 
The other person Wishman tells us about in his first chapter is an 
unnamed defendant in a criminal case prosecuted by Wishman roughly 
8-10 years prior to the incident with Mrs. Lewis. This earlier case dealt 
with a robbery and an associated assault and battery (with Mace) of the 
robbery victim. Here again, Wishman's story hinges on how he initially 
perceived his actions during trial (which led to the defendant's 
conviction), and how he later came to think that perhaps he had acted 
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inappropriately, and what Wishman did to correct the impropriety (as 
he then saw it) of his earlier actions. 
In the first case, regarding Mrs. Lewis, Wishman recounts how one 
night he was entering the lobby of a hospital's emergency room, 
escorting the sister of an injured client who was at the hospital. In 
crossing the lobby, Wishman was assailed by a nurse-Mrs. Lewis, it 
turns out, but at the time she was unknown to Wishman by name or 
sight. This nurse, infuriated by the mere sight of Wishman, shouted 
obscenities and tried to get Wishman thrown out ofthe hospital. 
When things calmed down, Wishman realized that this nurse had 
been the complainant and main witness in a rape case where Wishman 
had defended the alleged attacker. During his cross-examination ofthe 
nurse, Wishman had suggested that she had had consensual intercourse 
with the defendant and had filed a false rape charge when the defendant 
failed to pay for the sex. But now, in retrospect, after suffering this 
assault upon his own sensibilities, Wishman is somewhat shocked and 
abashed to realize, in recalling his treatment of the witness, that he had 
humiliated her. His cross-examination of Mrs. Lewis had exposed her to 
a second humiliation, heaped upon that of the first (her rape): 
Weighing on me more heavily than the possibility that I had helped a 
guilty man escape punishment was the undeniable fact that I had 
humiliated the victim-alleged victim-in my cross-examination of her. 
But, as all criminal lawyers know, to be effective in court I had to act 
forcefully, even brutally, at times. I had been trained in law school to 
regard the 'cross' as an art form. In the course of my career I had 
frequently discredited witnesses. My defense of myself had always 
been that there was nothing personal in what I was doing. This woman 
[Mrs. Lewis, the witness-victim] was obviously unwilling to dismiss my 
behavior as merely an aspect of my professional responsibility .... 15 
Wishman's initial view had been that brutality was a part of cross-
examination; perhaps not inevitably or necessarily a part of it, but the 
possibility of being brutal on cross-examination is always there in the 
trial process. Any aspiring lawyer learns, he says, that the "art" of cross-
examination might turn into a brutal exercise. To Wishman's mind, this 
possibility has to be accepted as a part of the price we pay for our 
adversarial system of justice. Its possible (or likely) effect on the witness 
is somehow justified by its being "merely" a part or aspect of a lawyer's 
"professional responsibility." 
In the second case, Wishman tells how it dawned on him, only after 
15 Wishman, supra note 2, at 6-7. 
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trial, that he had helped to convict a defendant who possibly was 
innocent. The defendant had visited an employment agency shortly 
before it was robbed, and the agency manager had been sprayed with 
Mace during the robbery. The agency manager had subsequently 
identified the defendant as the perpetrator, whereas the defendant 
proclaimed his innocence. The defense was based upon the defendant's 
claim to have visited the agency shortly before the attack, at which time 
the defendant had filled out some employment forms in his own 
handwriting. The defendant suggested that the manager was confusing 
the defendant with the assailant; the defendant's face "seemed" familiar 
to the victim (so the defense argument went) only because the defendant 
had visited the employment office earlier in the day. But the defense 
failed to offer any corroborating evidence of the defendant's earlier 
visit-for instance, the defendant might have offered (but did not) 
evidence ofthe earlier visit based upon an analysis of the job application 
forms filled out that day, using handwriting analysis from a specialist 
(whose fee would have been borne by the state). Apparently, such 
evidence might have shown that the defendant truly did visit the agency 
before the robbery (rather than a "shill" who, I suppose, might have 
visited it as an excuse for casing the place, and who might have written 
the defendant's name on the forms). Therefore, because the defendant 
failed to offer any such evidence, and because it could have been 
obtained fairly easily and at the expense of the state, Wishman as 
prosecutor dismissed the defendant's explanation of how the agency 
manage might have come to have confused the defendant's face with the 
face of the actual crimmal. "There were only two ways I could interpret 
the absence of a handwriting expert: either the defense counsel had been 
negligent or he knew an expert's testimony would have confirmed the 
guilt of his client."16 . 
The jury convicted the defendant, somewhat to the surprise of 
prosecutor Wishman and, initially, in the glow of victory, he was 
"elated." But his elation wore off as he yielded to a nagging doubt. 
"[Alfter the initial excitement of winning, I looked at what I had done. 
I had been so caught up in the contest, the adversarial battle of the trial, 
that it hadn't occurred to me that I might have been responsible for the 
conviction of an innocent man."17 So, with some anxiety, Wishman 
decided to send handwriting samples from the job application forms to 
an expert. The ensuing report seemed to confirm the defendant's 
explanation. After much effort and exertion (eight months after trial, 
16 Id. at II. 
17 Id. at 11-12. 
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while the defendant sat in prison), Wishman got the original conviction 
set aside. 
Since I hadn't had a 'substantial belief in the defendant's innocence, 
but believed only in the possibility of his innocence, [a judge whom 
Wishman respected] would have maintained that legal ethics required 
me to continue the prosecution of the case, leaving it to the jury to 
make the final decision about guilt. But I had not been able to let the 
case rest because I had found the possibility of having convicted an 
innocent man too upsetting from a personal standpoint. The prospect 
of fighting for the acquittal of guilty men, as I later would do as a 
defense lawyer, didn't disturb m~enying society the conviction to 
which it was entitled was a different matter, because 'society' was too 
abstract an idea for me. But Mrs. Lewis, the nurse I humiliated years 
later, would be a casualty of my skill as a defense lawyer in winning an 
acquittal, and Mrs. Lewis was not an abstract idea, even if it had taken 
her screams to bring that fact home to me.1S 
Wishman's initial assessment of his own actions-his unthinking 
assumption about them-is that he is merely doing his chosen 
professional task well, both in terms of his vicarious responsibility for 
his client (i.e., protecting and advancing the client's interests through 
legal means) and in terms of his personal responsibility for doing his job 
well (i.e., undertaking and fulfilling the task of cross-examination, or the 
task of prosecuting an accused criminal). Wishman knew how to present 
a case to a jury, he knew how to cross-examine a hostile witness; and 
that is the end of his responsibility for his actions or their consequences. 
On this view of the matter, then, each legal task or action involved 
Wishman only as a professional, only in his professional capacity; it did 
not implicate him as a person, or in any personal way. In the nurse's 
case, Mrs. Lewis simply did not understand that "as all criminal lawyers 
know, to be effective in court I had to act forcefully, even brutally, at 
times. I had been trained in law school to regard the 'cross' as an art 
form. In the course of my career I had frequently discredited witnesses. 
My defense of myself had always been that there was nothing personal 
in what I was doing."19 And this conception of professional responsibility 
is not idiosyncratic to Wishman; it is widely shared throughout the legal 
profession by lawyers and judges. 
For example, in the (wrongly?) accused defendant's case, Wishman 
remembers that when he tried to inform the original trial judge ofthe 
18 Id. at 13-14 (emphasis in original). 
19 Id. at 6. 
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possible wrongful conviction, the judge rejected Wishman's attempt to 
intervene, or to correct what he now saw as a mistake. "The judge said 
I had had no business meddling with the conviction; our adversary 
system had separate roles: a prosecutor should prosecute and a defense 
lawyer should defend, and if I had had doubts about the handwriting, 
they should have been resolved before the conviction."2o Wishman did 
not, however, end up accepting this judge's view of his responsibility for 
the result of that trial. Similarly, almost a decade later, Wishman was 
shocked by Mrs. Lewis' attack, and he began to realize that he had 
humiliated her in cross-examination. 
So Wishman comes to see himself and his actions differently; he 
comes to see an aspect of himself and his actions that he had previously 
missed. For whatever reason, Wishman's experiences get him thinking, 
forcing him to think about who he is as a lawyer and what kind of a 
lawyer-and a person-he is turning himself into as he continues 
through his admittedly successful legal career. 
The very last paragraph in Wishman's chapter closes with an 
expression of fear: "[O]ne thing was clear: that nurse's anger, her 
palpable hatred of me, frightened me. Not that I expected her to harm 
me physically, but I was frightened by the person she saw ... frightened 
that I could be seen that way ... frightened that I might be that person."21 
The fear expressed here is as palpable as Mrs. Lewis' hatred for 
Wishman, and it is complex. In part, of course, Wishman fears the force 
of Mrs. Lewis' assault; but another aspect is Wishman's recognition that 
he fears what-if he explores further his actions and his thoughts about 
them-he may learn about himself. Self-knowledge is not easy, and it is 
not pretty, and it is not fun, however much it may benefit us. A medicine 
may help us, but its bitterness still repels, and the taste may linger. 
"[This] is why the path of self-knowledge is so ugly, hence so rarely 
taken, whatever its reputed beauties. The knowledge of the self as it is 
always takes place in the betrayal of the self as it was. "22 How many of 
us truly want to know who we are and what we have done? Wishman's 
willingness to confront himself and his actions is unusual, and 
unusually candid. 
20 rd. at 12. 
21 rd. at 18 (emphasis in original). This honest portrayal of the anxiety in two people 
confronting one another, is one of the best things about Wishman's account. It seems to 
capture the anxiety we can feel when we truly inquire into who we are and what we have 
done (or what we are in the process of doing). 
22 Stanley Cavell, THE WORLD VIEWED: REFLECTIONS ON THE ONTOLOGY OF FILM 160 (New 
York: Viking Press, 1971). 
HeinOnline -- 21 Legal Stud. F. 208 1997
208 Legal Studies Forum Vol. 21 
IV. PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY IS PERSONAL 
Without having done justice to the rhythm of Wishman's story, 
which develops naturally and powerfully to its climax in the frightening 
recognition scene I have just quoted, and without having done justice to 
its moral complexity (because it is not simply obvious that Wishman's 
initial actions were morally wrong), I want to consider briefly one aspect 
of Wishman's dawning awareness that perhaps he had done wrong 
(morally). What I think Wishman begins to see or to realize is that he 
and his behavior could be viewed the way they were seen by Mrs. 
Lewis-because he begins to see himself and his actions this way. This 
leads me to ask two questions: First, how is it that Wishman could be 
blind, initially, to this possible way of se·eing himself and his actions? 
Second, what allows or enables him to become aware of this possibility? 
What lets him see himself in this way (i.e., in the way that Mrs. Lewis 
saw him)? 
Wishman had not known or understood-had not been aware of 
(until Mrs. Lewis screamed at him)-how he had acted toward her when 
he, Wishman, had questioned her during the rape trial. Similarly, as 
Wishman admits, he had not been aware of what he might be doing in 
the robbery-Mace assault case ("it hadn't occurred to me that I might 
have been responsible for the conviction of an innocent man,,23). What 
seems to make this blindness possible is Wishman's acceptance of the 
common ideology oflawyering. Wishman believes, that is, that while he 
is engaged in the activities that constitute being a lawyer, he is 
responsible only for representing the best interests of his client (and, 
thus, his moral responsibility is reduced or narrowed to coincide with 
the limits of his vicarious responsibility to his client). Whoever gets in 
the way of the protection of his client's interests is fair game: any such 
person can be treated with impunity by Wishman, apparently, so long 
as Wishman's actions toward this other person protect the legitimate 
interests ofWishman's client. 
This is, I believe, the common internal vision ofthe legal profession, 
its understanding of its responsibilities. So, ascribing such a view to 
Wishman may not be controversial. Still, evidence supporting the 
ascription of this view to Wishman can be found throughout his story. 
Consider a sampling of passages in which Wishman describes his 
motivations and satisfactions: 
23 Wishman, supra note 2, at 11. 
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(1) About Injustice 
I had applied to law school with a deeply held beliefthat I could satisfy 
some high, even noble, expectations as a lawyer. Although I had never 
articulated what those expectations were, I knew I cared about the 
poor and the underdog; although I may have had only a hazy idea of 
what justice was, I did have an acute, albeit intuitive, sense of 
injustice.24 
* * * * 
[AJs for any moral component to my work, I knew that it had less to do 
with right and wrong than with an obscure identification with the 
underdog, even a despicable underdog, against authority. 25 
(2) About The Judge for Whom He Clerked 
I clerked for a criminal trial judge, Charles S. Barrett, Jr., of the 
Superior Court of New Jersey, a gentleman of humor and intelligence 
and decency. Every day in the course of his trials Judge Barrett made 
specific decisions based on his sense of justice. Of course, he was 
guided by statutes and opinions of higher courts, but the details of a 
case often required interpretations that could be made only by relying 
on his personal convictions. I greatly admired the judge for those 
personal convictions; I sensed he had struggled with the more profound 
human questions and answered them with a consistency that seemed 
well-considered intellectually and satisfying emotionally. There was 
nothing I wanted more than one day to be a man of such integrity and 
conviction.26 
(3) About Learning The Lawyer's Craft 
I had to admit that I was getting more out of what I was doing as a 
criminal lawyer than money or the intellectual satisfaction of 
supporting the legal system. I would confess, over the years, to ego 
gratification and the joy of good craftsmanship: plotting out an 
intricate strategy, carrying off a good cross-examination, soaring 
through a moving summation-and the sound of the jury saying 'not 
guilty-are all thrilling.27 
24 Id. at 7. 
25 Id. at 17. 
26 Id. at 7. 
27 Id. at 16-17. 
* * * * 
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I tried, as an act of will, to limit my vision to what I actually did in the 
courtroom-the trial was a fascinating process, a game, and I was good 
at it and getting better all the time. I didn't believe I was making the 
world safer from criminals; I was learning a trade that I enjoyed, and, 
like most prosecutors, I was getting the experience and credentials I 
needed to go out on my own in private practice.28 
* * * * 
So I began trying one case after another, and I learned my trade and 
loved what I learned.29 
These remarks express Wishman's cares and commitments, his values, 
and they number three: (1) he says that he cared deeply about injustice, 
especially as it related to poor people; (2) he expresses his admiration 
and affection for the judge for whom he clerked; and (3) he tells of his 
satisfaction in learning the craft of criminal litigation, the skills of 
lawyering. These three areas of value and concern are the three areas 
to which Wishman has committed himself in his formation as a lawyer; 
they are the things about which Wishman most cares. (Only in the law? 
Or in his life? Or can the two not be separated?) 
I do not think that Wishman's cares and commitments are 
idiosyncratic. They seem, on the contrary, to be quite ordinary concerns 
for any person aspiring to be a lawyer in America in the late twentieth 
century. For example, Wishman's expectations in law school and his own 
sense of justice (or of injustice) remain inarticulate, ''hazy'' and 
"obscure." (Well, who among us has managed to articulate his 
expectations, or her sense of injustice? In law school, or in practice?) 
Wishman allows that he wants to emulate Judge Barrett, and yet he 
finds that he has neither the judge's faith in God nor the judge's belief 
in our penal system.30 (Who among us can say otherwise? Who among us 
28 Id. at 15. 
29 Id. at 10. 
30 Wishman gives this account of the distance he perceives between himself and Judge 
Barrett: 
Now as I thought back about my judge, almost twenty years later, fresh from my 
disquieting encounter with Mrs. Lewis, I admired more than ever, and envied, his 
ability to prevent difficult and, at times, harsh decisions from disturbing other parts 
of his life. Although I firmly believed that society required criminal laws to protect 
itself, I could not put aside my belief that the acts of a criminal, horrendous as they 
often were, were usually caused by factors or events beyond the control of the 
'criminal.' And the thought of an inhumane penal system raised in my mind, and 
more so in my heart, the gravest doubts about the whole system of justice. Lastly, 
ifit had been religious belief that gave my judge the strength to do the harsh things 
his job required, I, unfortunately, didn't have such belief. 
Id. at 8-9. 
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does not have a hero or heroine to whom we do not measure up?) 
Finally, Wishman enjoys the sense of mastering his craft, but his 
gratification stems from "the joy of good craftsmanship," nothing more. 
(In our profession, isn't this common enough?) 
If Wishman's history is unexceptional, then I would guess that his 
sense of impersonality and anonymity (with respect to people and events 
who appear during the course of his life yet who seem to be essentially 
unconnected with his life) also matches a large number oflife-stories for 
lawyers. For most of us lawyers, we are "hired guns" or mouthpieces, 
doing the legal work for others, and happy about it to the extent that we 
are relatively well-paid for our services. If our work is vicarious, then so 
too are our pleasures or gratifications. 
We can assess the morality of Wishman's actions in this regard by 
developing George Fletcher's insight that "the normal commitments of 
our lives-expressed as 'loyalties'-provide a sounder basis for the moral 
life than [does] an Enlightenment ideal that is ... incapable of 
realization."31 The opposite of loyalty is betrayal, and I have earlier 
quoted Stanley Cavell to the effect that we come to learn the self only in 
our betrayals of it. The term "betrayal" is usefully ambiguous here, 
because it connotes both expression and treachery (or disloyalty). I 
understand Cavell's point to be two-fold. First, his remark means that 
we come to learn about the self to the extent that we "betray" it by 
expressing or revealing it. So our knowledge of a self (be it our own or 
another person's) consists in, or depends upon, its being revealed. Self-
knowledge turns upon the extent to which, and the ways in which, we 
reveal ourselves in and by our actions (which consist in our words as 
well as our deeds). But, second, Cavell's conception of self-knowledge 
also means that self-knowledge retains the bitter taste of betrayal, 
because to bear witness to (or to recognize) the self is necessarily to 
move beyond (or outside) it-to view it from the outside, as though it 
were an object. And this objectification of the self is, in a sense, a 
betrayal of it, a disloyalty to it (as the self stood-even if this "betrayal" 
is done on behalf of the self as it now stands). 
31 George Fletcher, LoYALTY: AN ESSAY ON THE MORALITY OF RELATIONSlllPS x (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1993). 
The idea that our ordinary cares and commitments are fundamental to our moral 
standing and status, is central to Part Three of Stanley Cavell's monumental work, The 
Claim of Reason. See Stanley Cavell, THE CLAIM OF REASON: Wl'ITGENSTElN, SKEPITCISM, 
Morality, and TRAGEDY 245-326 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979). A similar idea 
is a motivating force in Harry Frankfurt's collection of philosophical papers. See Harry G. 
Frankfurt, THE IMPORTANCE OF WHAT WE CARE ABOUT (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1988)(especially Chapters 7-8). 
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I would put the broader moral of both Fletcher's and Cavell's 
remarks this way: Morality is as much or more a matter of trying to 
understand and assess human (personal) relationships, as it is one of 
trying to understand and assess human actions according to impersonal 
rules or principles or laws or maxims. Because of this, if we are to 
understand and appreciate our moral responsibility, then we must 
understand and appreciate our relationships with and to the people, 
places, and things that constitute our lives. This is a very abstract or 
general way of saying that morality is in part a matter of relating 
ourselves to others, and to our selves. So, for example, Cavell says: 
In ... morality, one human being confronts another in terms of that 
person's position, and in a mode which acknowledges the relation he is 
taking towards it. And in ... [morality], 'in terms of that person's 
position' means, in terms of what he is doing and must do and ought to 
do. In ... morality this means, in terms of his cares and commitments .... 
The problems of morality then become which values we are to honor 
and create, and which responsibilities we must accept, and which we 
have, in our conduct, and by our position, incurred.32 
In attending to some of Wishman's commitments and in compiling, a 
moment ago in my text, a list of his loyalties, I was trying to use 
Fletcher's and Cavell's insights (on the nature of morality, and on the 
nature of self-knowledge) as a way of coming to learn who Wishman was 
when he acted the way he did toward Mrs. Lewis and the unnamed 
accused defendant. I was trying, in other words, to gain some knowledge 
of his self (as it then stood in relation to those people and events). 
This method of self-knowledge (which proceeds by attending to a 
person's cares and commitments and personal relations) is also a method 
of moral analysis. It is a way of judging the morality of Wishman's 
actions, because it affords us a way of coming to learn what he was doing 
when he acted in those ways toward those people. It allows us to observe 
how Wishman thought and spoke about his own actions and about those 
other people. In particular, this method affords us a way to collect and 
assess the reasons that Wishman gave, or the excuses he entered, in 
explaining his behavior. These reasons or excuses or explanations are 
what Cavell calls "elaboratives," and they are (on Cavell's view of 
morality) important moral data: 
[K]nowing what you are doing and what you are going to do and what 
you have not done, cannot fully be told by looking at what in fact, in 
32 Cavell, supra note 31, at 325 (emphasis in original). 
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the world, you do. To know what you are doing is to be able to elaborate 
the action: say why you are doing it, if that is competently asked; or 
excuse or justify it if that becomes necessary. What you do and fail to 
do are permanent facts of history, and the root of responsibility. But 
the trunk and branch of responsibility are what you are answerable for. 
And where your conduct raises a question, your answers will again be 
elaboratives. I have described moral arguments as ones whose direct 
point it is to determine the positions we are assuming or are able or 
willing to assume responsibility for; and discussion is necessary 
because our responsibilities, the extensions of our cares and 
commitments, and the implications of our conduct, are not obvious; 
because the self is not obvious to the self.33 
213 
If our responsibilities are "the extensions of our cares and 
commitments," and if "the implications of our conduct ... are not 
obvious," then it seems true that what the self has done-our actions, 
these extensions of our selves-need not be clear or obvious to us. Or, at 
least, their meaning, their consequences, their morality, need not be 
clear or obvious. And, in cases where their meaning or moral 
implications are not clear or obvious, in order to discover or to discern 
their moral meaning or implications, we shall have to analyze and argue 
and, generally, discuss these matters. In this sense, then, "the self is not 
obvious to the self." What a particular self is, and what it has done, and 
what it is doing, and what it is capable of doing, are not obvious to us. 
They require elaboration-as, for example, I am trying to elaborate the 
moral aspects ofWishman's actions as they relate to issues and concepts 
of professional responsibility. 
V. THE NECESSITY OF ACCEPTING RESPONSIBILITY 
From my perspective, professional responsibility is-and must 
be-personal. It is the recognition that lawyers are people doing things 
to (and for) other people (as well as doing things to and for themselves). 
And, whatever else professional responsibility is or may be, it is a matter 
33 Id. at 311-312 (emphases in original). Continuing his thought, Cavell says: 
To the extent that that responsibility is the subject of moral argument, what makes 
moral argument rational is not the assumption that there is in every situation one 
thing which ought to be done and that this may be known, nor the assumption that 
we can always come to agreement about what ought to be done on the basis of 
rational methods. Its rationality lies in following the methods which lead to a 
knowledge of our own position, of where we stand; in short, to a knowledge and 
definition of ourselves. 
Id. at 312. 
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of our coming to learn to understand and assess the ways in which 
people behave in the roles and through the forms that the law makes 
available to them (as lawyers, as clients, as parties to legal actions, etc.). 
So, for example, I read Wishman's story as illustrating a growth in 
professional responsibility because it illustrates a movement of the self 
toward increased understanding and assessment (as my motto from 
George Eliot would term it, this movement proceeds from "moral 
stupidity" toward professional responsibility). 
I understand Wishman's growth or professional development-the 
increase in his moral sensitivity and sensibility-to be based, in 
particular, upon his having taken personal responsibility for what was 
happening, or for what had happened. On my view, Wishman took 
personally-and saw his own personal stake in-the actions or events 
that he recounts in the first chapter of his book. Wishman saw how he 
was implicated lin what happened. to Mrs. Lewis, what was done to her 
(by him through the means and tools he had mastered from the medium 
I 
of our legal sysFem [e.g., cross-examination as an "art"]). Wishman saw 
or realized that he, a person, did that to Mrs. Lewis, another person, on 
behalf of yet a third person (Wishman's client). Now, the question arises: 
How could Wishman have done that to her? 
In studying Wishman's account of how he related to Mrs. Lewis and 
to the possibly falsely accused defendant he prosecuted, and paying 
some attention to Wishman's remarks about his relations with other 
people, I notice that, time and again, Wishman explains or excuses his 
behavior by saying, in effect, "Nothing personal."34 (For example, the 
adversarial attack on Mrs. Lewis had not been meant or intended by 
him to be taken personally.) Wishman distances himself, that is, from 
any activity going on or from its effect, by claiming for it an impersonal 
status (in terms of its intent or animus). Or he excuses himselffor doing 
what he does as a lawyer by claiming that it is meant only to achieve a 
certain legal effect (the suggestion being that its effect on the person of 
any party involved in the legal process is, thus, irrelevant). 
The suggestion seems to be, then, that you (the object of my attack) 
should not take my attack (my action) personally-even though you are 
a person and I am a person, and this is how I treated you. But what 
sense does this suggestion make, when the context is one in which this 
is the relationship we have-because this is the way that I have acted 
3. Wishman, supra note 2, at 6. See also id. at 7, 8 (twice), 9,13,16,17, and 18, for other 
contexts in which Wishman invokes the term "personal" in characterizing a relationship 
that he either did or did not have with someone who in some way mattered to his life (in 
terms of his development as a lawyer). 
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toward you? Somehow, it seems, I (the actor) expect you (the sufferer of 
my action) to ignore the relation I have already established between us 
(by means of the way I have acted). How is this to be done-can it be 
erased magically? Or else, you (the sufferer of my action) are supposed 
to absolve me of my moral responsibility for having treated you this way. 
Why? Because I have the role I have in our legal system or because I 
play the part of a lawyer in our society? None of these possible responses 
or explanations makes sense to me morally; they seem to ignore the fact 
that the morality of a person's actions is based, in large part, upon the 
nature of the relationships such actions establish (or define or destroy 
or modify) with the people affected by those actions. 
How we might recognize this basic fact of moral responsibility and 
act upon it (rather than ignoring it), is suggested in the way that 
Wishman subsequently acted toward Mrs. Lewis and the allegedly 
falsely accused defendant. In the case of the accused defendant, 
Wishman tells us that he himself "was relieved by the thought that [hel 
had done all [hel could to undo a possible miscarriage of justice for 
which [hel had, in part, been responsible."35 Wishman admits, further, 
that he ''had not been able to let the case rest because [hel had found the 
possibility of having convicted an innocent man too upsetting from a 
personal standpoint."36 Wishman took the situation-the plight of the 
convicted man-seriously because he took it personally, felt his personal 
involvement in the case; and because he accepted his share of the 
responsibility for this perhaps innocent man having been convicted. 
(Perhaps these two characterizations-taking something personally, and 
accepting one's responsibility-are simply two ways of saying the same 
thing.) 
As to Mrs. Lewis, Wishman came to treat her as a person, not an 
abstraction. "Mrs. Lewis was not an abstract idea, even if it had taken 
her screams to bring that fact home to me."37 So, unlike the abstraction, 
"society," Wishman came to feel some connection, with Mrs. Lewis, some 
solidarity with her, which meant that he no longer could cavalierly 
dismiss the way he treated her. "I could no longer deflect the 
realization-this chilling glimpse of myself-that I had used all my skill 
and energy on behalf of a collection of criminals. Not all of them, but 
many, had been monsters-nothing less-who had done monstrous 
thingS."38 Again, this perception led Wishman to take responsibility for 
35 Id. at 12. 
36 Id. at 13. 
37 Id. at 14. 
38 Id. at 16. 
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his actions, for what he had done. To the accusatory question, asked of 
Wishman time and again-"Don't you take responsibility for what a 
criminal you get off may do next?" Wishman's once flippant answer was 
no longer self-availing. "I could no longer give that answer. I didn't want 
to be flippant with Mrs. Lewis, nor could I dismiss her with lofty, 
jurisprudential arguments. The ferocity of my courtroom performances, 
and those of other criminal lawyers, had terrible consequences on 
individual lives."39 Here, I think, we witness Wishman taking 
responsibility for his actions and even for the way the legal system 
treats the accusers of criminals-which can be, terribly. Wishman 
humiliated Mrs. Lewis on cross-examination; and the subsequent 
realization-that he did this to her-enables him, or compels him, to 
accept his responsibility (-for having done that to her on behalf 
of.-vicariously for-his client). 
I have said that Wishman's story is a tale of moral progress, a kind 
of pilgrim's progress if you will, and my title suggests one way of 
characterizing the trajectory of this case of professional development. 
But Wishman's story illustrates more than merely his own reformation, 
or transformation; it is a morality tale for all legal professionals (and, 
perhaps, for all professionals; so, too, then, perhaps for all people). 
On the question of self-transformation, or the reformation of the self, 
I know of no better book than Herbert Fingarette's The Self in 
Transformation.40 There Fingarette argues that "the essence of 
therapeutic and moral progress is ... to accept responsibility, i.e., to 
accept as ours the task of doing something about [the problems 
confronting us] ."41 In psycho-therapy this means that "[a]pparently the 
patient must accept responsibility for traits and actions of his which are 
the inevitable results of events over which he had no control and of 
actions which he did not consciously will."42 Despite the fact that we 
cannot control all ofthe events in which we are implicated, or all ofthe 
results of our actions, Fingarette argues that it remains fair to hold us 
responsible for these things. "[P]aradoxical as it may seem, this is 
precisely the case.,,43 
This may seem a harsh view of life, an arbitrary and inhumane 
one. In fact it is harsh to a degree, but it is not arbitrary or inhumane. 
39 Id. at 17. 
40 Herbert Fingarette, THE SELF IN TRANSFORMATION: PSYCHOANALYSIS, PHILOSOPHY, AND 
THE LIFE OF THE SPIRIT (New York: Basic Books, 1963). 
41 Id. at 163 (emphasis in original). 
42 Id. (emphasis in original). 
43 Id. (emphasis in original). 
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It is the brute fact which mature human beings and immature ones 
with moral insight have long recognized in their practice and at times 
in their theory. 
It is not arbitrary, for there is a reason for accepting 
responsibility.... [T)his [seems] an unjustifiable burden. And it will 
always appear unjustifiable so long as one looks to the past for the 
reason. It is to the future, however, that we must look for the 
justification of this profound moral demand. It is not that we were 
children and thus nonresponsible but rather that we are aiming to 
become mature persons. This ideal, and not the past, is the ground for 
the harsh demand that we accept responsibility for what we are, even 
though we are in many ways morally evil and even though we could 
not help ourselves. 
Guilt is retrospective, but responsibility is prospective. 
Responsibility is based upon a willingness to face the world as it is 
now and to proceed to do what we can to make it the world as we 
would like it to be. To accept responsibility is to be responsible for 
what shall be done." 
217 
Earlier in his book, Fingarette says that self-transformation can be 
thought of or characterized as "the movement from\immaturity to 
maturity, from ignorance to insight, from bondage to liberation, from sin 
to salvation, or in any of a number of other ways .... "45 In choosing the 
figure of "moral stupidity" from Eliot's vast novel, Middlemarch, I have 
betrayed my own proclivity for wishing to think of professional 
development as a kind of movement from innocence to experience, or 
sinfulness to salvation.46 
I conclude this section, and this stretch of thinking, by quoting 
Fingarette once again: 
To face the world and oneself as they truly are and to accept 
responsibility for what in each of these one can control are the 
necessary conditions of maturity. It is not a penance for the past but 
the price of the future. Humility is of the essence. 
« Id. at 164 (emphases in original). 
45 Id. at 10. 
46 There is another point of similarity between Fingarette's thought and Eliot's image. 
Fingarette makes the following comment: 
Responsibility comes relatively late in life; guilt appears very early in life. Thus we 
can be guilty where we are not responsible .... In this sense, at least, we are born into 
sin. For we are involved with evil and guilt before we are able to assume that 
responsibility for our self which might, at least ideally, keep us from having the 
wishes which constitute morally the fact of the spirit's corruption. 
Id. at 168. 
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Honest humility reveals that to accept responsibility, considering 
what we start with, is a heavy burden. To say, as criticism, that this 
is not 'fair' or 'just' is to suppose that the world is fair and just. This is 
precisely what the world is not. It has no design leading to some 
inevitable, built-in moral future. It is we human beings who can reach 
humanity only by accepting the challenge to make the world just.47 
VI. WHAT HOPE OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE IN A TRADITIONAL LEGAL 
ETHICS CLASS? 
Wishman's story tells how he was shocked out of his complacency by 
some one's reaction to his behavior as a lawyer; and how, years earlier, 
he himself had been shocked by his own callousness, his own wilful 
indifference or blindness to the quite real possibility that he had helped 
to convict an innocent man. These two confrontations with himself and 
with his behavior as a lawyer, these two self-revelations, led Wishman 
to ponder what kind of a lawyer-and what kind of a person-he was 
becoming. These two incidents shook Wishman out of his self-absorption 
into an appreciation of what George Eliot, in my motto, calls the 
"equivalent centre of self," of solidity and worth, that any other human 
being possesses. These experiences also, simultaneously, enabled 
Wishman to see his own relationship to these "equivalent" selves, for 
whose fate Wishman at least took partial responsibility on a personal 
basis. 
Wishman's discoveries about himself exemplify one course that 
moral development or growth can take. It is not that moral change must 
happen this way, but only that it can occur in this way. Wishman's 
autobiography portrays, then, one way in which a person can become 
aware of the moral dimension or aspect of his actions. This dawning 
awareness is not an abstract idea; rather, it is what Eliot calls a 
conception "with that distinctness which is no longer reflection but 
feeling-an idea wrought back to the directness of sense."48 Such a 
feeling has sufficient force to make us stop and think; and then, with the 
help of self-reflection, or critical thinking, perhaps we can change our 
ways. In this respect, then, by scrutinizing Wishman's story, we may 
learn something more about moral development. 
Having said this, however, I am not sanguine about the possibility 
(much less, the likelihood) of such learning taking place in a traditional 
class on Legal Ethics. Wishman made the discoveries he made-about 
47 Id. at 166 (emphasis in original). 
4. See text, supra, at note 1. 
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himself, about the law, about lawyering, about what he had done to Mrs. 
Lewis and others-because he was able to refer to his actions in the 
contexts in which they truly occurred. As I have tried to make clear in 
Sections I and II of this paper, teachers of a traditional Legal Ethics 
class are not able to reproduce or duplicate actual lawsuits, parties, or 
clients. Because of this, I know of no way in which students in such 
classes can work on relating themselves to such entities. And, without 
testing and assessing the ability or inability of students to do these 
things, I think it unlikely that students in traditional Legal Ethics 
classes can make similar discoveries about themselves (i.e., discoveries 
similar to the ones Wishman made about himself). With respect to a law 
school course designed along what I have been calling "traditional" lines, 
then, self-knowledge is not vouchsafed the students. 
We claim that Socratic teaching is a form of self-knowledge, or that 
it is based upon a method designed to lead to self-knowledge; certainly, 
I have said such things in print, and I believe them.49 But this claim can 
be made for that method of teaching only because the tools and 
materials for coming to learn something about ourselves are all there, 
in the typical law school classroom. In a traditional Legal Ethics class, 
I claim they are not. We lack something, we are missing something-if, 
that is, our aim is to achieve self-knowledge about the morality of our 
actions and our ability to resolve ethical conflicts (as opposed, for 
example, to learning or memorizing the provisions of our professional 
codes). 
Try as I may, I do not have much hope that anything I do 
pedagogically in such a classroom can redress or supply what is lacking. 
And this is why I said at the beginning of this paper, I find such 
teaching unrewarding. -Still, I accept responsibility for it, and for what 
I do in the classroom in response to this lack. 
49 See my essay cited supra, note 4. 
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